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It is often asserted that, whatever role Keynesian policies may have played in underpinning the long
post war boom*,‘those  policies are no longer relevant. In contrast this paper seeks to reassert the need
for Keynesian policies in order to secure f%U employment. In doing so, as will be seen below, we
interpret Keynesian economic policies in a rather broad sense, and speciticahy  wish to distance
ourselves from treating Keynesian policies as virtually synonymous with fiscal demand management
designed to fine tune the economy.L.We  also recognizethat. there are manyconstraints. on the pursuit  . .
of fit11 employment, arising from the demand and the supply sides,- and that the key  objective>of
Keynesian policies is to alleviate those constraints in the pursuit of full employment.
This paper puts forward an approach to economic policy which could be described as post
Keynesian. Since the term Keynesian policies has been variously defined, we indicate in section II
what we mean by the term, which is broader than most usages. The case for Keynesian policies arises
out of, and can only be appreciated by reference to, a conception of the operations of a market
economy, and we briefly outline the conception underlying this paper in section III. This is further
elaborated in section IV by a consideration of the constraints on the achievement on Ml employment
in a market economy. This leads into section V in which we outline the nature of Keynesian policies
which relate to both the demand side and the supply side of the economy. The final main section,
section VI, considers some of the constraints on the implementation of the type of Keynesian policies
which we are advocating.
II. WHAT ARE KEYNESIAN POLICIES
The term Keynesian policies tends to be associated with demand management, especially those
seeking to fine tune the economy using fiscal policy. Our concept of Keynesian policies (and one
could debate the rather Cuitless issue of whether this concept is really Keynesian) is rather different,
and would not generally include attempts to fine tune. It would though include some ‘coarse tuning’,
namely the idea that the government use budget deficits (or rather less likely)  surpluses in order to
underpin a level of aggregate demand sufficient for the generation of the highest sustainable levels
of employment (and to use monetary policy to achieve the lowest possible level of interest rates), and
this follows from our denial of the relevance of Say’s Law for a monetary economy with a
sophisticated financial sector. On the demand side, Keynesian policies are likely to include measures
such as the encouragement of investment designed in part to raise aggregate demand (as well as to
boost productive capacity.3  It would also include a variety of supply-enhancing policies designed to
iii constraints on the achievement of full employment (such as those derived from the foreign trade
position, shortages of productive capacity, etc). While the focus in this paper is on policies designed
to raise the level of employment, similar but not identical considerations arise in relation to growth
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side, they are fundamentally different from what are often described as supply-side measures: we
would view those latter measures as broadly seeking to create the resemblance of a perfectly
competitive market by the removal of perceived imperfections. In contrast, we would view supply-
enhancing policies (as put fonvard below) as seeking to ease constraints such as any inflation barrier.
There are two basic insights of Keynes for the workings of industrialized market economies upon
which we draw. The first is that a laissez-faire market economy (that is one without significant
government economic intervention, and not synonymous with an approximately perfectly competitive
economy) will not usually generate full employment. The essential cause of that failure to create full
employment is not some rigidities or ‘imperfections’ of monopolistic competition, trade unions etc.
which could potentially be removed through government action (cf. Shapiro, 1996, Arestis, 1992).
It is rather that a, 1aissez;faire  marketeconomy~would exhibit elements of instabilityand~doesnot-.
usually generate a level of aggregate demand-consistent with full employment. .. : .‘, 1’
The second is that whilst full employment is a prime objective of Keynesian economic policy, a more
equal distribution of market power, income and wealth, is another desirable goal in its own right and
as a vehicle for increasing general prosperity. As Keynes (193 6) remarked, “The outstanding faults
of the economic society in which we live are its failure to provide for full employment and its arbitrary
and inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes” (p. 372). More recently, similar sentiments have
been expressed, “The future prosperity of OECD countries depends”, an influential report (OECD,
1996) asserts, “on reducing social and economic exclusion in the forms of high unemployment, non-
participation in the labour markeLand, in some instances, growing inequalities in earnings and
incomes.” Meanwhile research at a -global level seems to have identified a positive correlation
between economic growth and income equality (United Nations Development Programme,  1996).
III. OPERATION OF MARKET ECONOMIES
In a decentralized monetary economy there is no automatic market mechanism which ensures that
aggregate demand is sufficient to purchase full employment aggregate supply (even in the absence
of other constraints such as balance of trade, insufficient capital equipment). Thus inadequate
aggregate demand may prevent the achievement of full employment. The problems of co-ordination
between aggregate demand and potential aggregate supply can be viewed as an inevitable
consequence of a decentralized monetary economy, even if some of the problems can be reduced by
appropriate policies and institutional arrangements. There are benefits from the existence of money
and of exchange, but there are also some inevitable costs, arising from failures of co-ordination in a
decentralized economy (Clower, 1965), and more importantly, from the existence of liquidity
preference and the uncertainty which causes it, preventing co-ordination of aggregate demand and
supply at full employment (Chick, 1983; Davidson, 1994).
This basic Keynesian idea on the importance of aggregate demand operates in a range of ways
additional to those analyzed by Keynes, most notably that the supply side (of labor and of capital
equipment) is influenced over the long haul by the demand side. For not only are additions to the
stock of capital equipment (investment) influenced by the general level of demand, but also the
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Iabor draw people into the work force, whilst low levels of demand push people out of the measured
workforce.  Thus it is not only ratios such as the rate of unemployment and capacity utilization which
are influenced by aggregate demand, but also the scale of the economy (labor force, capital stock).’
We begin from the empirical perspective that full employment has been a rare peace time occurrence
in market economies, which suggests that the forces creating unemployment are powerful ones. We
observe that at the time of writing around 18 million of people (11 per cent of the workforce) are -._
reported as unemployed within the European Union, and 33 million in the OECD area (and many
estimates would put actual unemployment much higher). Most would agree that levels of
unemployment have been significant for at least the past quarter of century (and during much of the
inter-war period before that). Many would view market economies as potentially approximating
perfect competition in which full employment occurs when markets clear. From this perspective
unemployment would.be  seen as-arising from those ‘imperfections’ where those ‘imperfections are
measured against what would~occur ina. perfectly competitive economy (and this we would view as
an important aspect of the new Keynesian approach, e.g. papers in Mankiw and Romer, 1991). The
removal of ‘imperfections’ can then become a major objective of government economic policy in
order to construct the Nirvana of perfect competition. Whilst many would agree on the unrealism of
perfect competition, it still, in our view, has a strong influence over thinking on macroeconomic
policies.
The view of the operation of market economies which under-pins our approach has three strands.
Fii competition within a market economy is a process of rivalry with winners and losers. There are
significant economic, social and political forces which generate and reinforce disparities and
inequalities, whether between individuals, between regions or countries etc.. This is an application
of the notion that success breeds success and the corollary failure breeds failure.’ In the economic
sphere, the operation of market forces generate cumulative causation (Myrdal,  1957) and
centrapetalism  (Cowling, 1987, 1990). An economically successful region generates profits which
enable further investment; it can attract mobile, often highly skilled, labor from other regions; it can
benefit from static and dynamic economies of scale (Kaldor, 1972). Unemployment and low wages
are both characteristics of relatively less prosperous regions, and full employment in the more
prosperous regions would still entail unemployment in the less prosperous regions6 Any fkther
attempts to reduce unemployment through demand stimulation is likely to cause problems of
insufficient capacity, shortages of skills and inflationary pressures in the more prosperous regions.
One part of the significance of the forces of cumulative causation is that the relatively backward
regions will experience not only lower levels of per capita income but also face higher levels of
unemployment and severe constraints on their ability to grow. The consequence of this is that whilst
there are forces for convergence between regions and countries, there are also strong forces for
divergence. Regions which are relatively backward will display both lower levels of per capita income
and higher levels of unemployment, and find considerable difficulty in catching up with more
prosperous regions.’ A related aspect of this general view concerns international trade. In a world
ofprimary  products it is reasonable to argue that international trade will (or should) be governed by
comparative advantage, arising from the endowments of nature. But in a world of manufactured
goods and of services, where new products are being continuously developed, where economies of
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is recognized as important for economic success, competitive advantage comes to the fore (Porter,
1990). The notion of competitive advantage contains a strong element of cumulative causation for
clearly success in one time period generates the surplus which can be used to build success in
subsequent periods. The availability of that surplus does not guarantee that it will be used to build
future success. The surplus can be used’in other ways ranging from high levels of luxury and
conspicuous consumption through to military expenditure which may eventually lead to economic and
political decline (Kennedy, 1988). But the availability of a surplus is a pre-requisite for growth and
competitive success. Competitive advantage can to some degree be created (as is clear from the
Japanese economic success over.the past fifty years) whereas comparative advantage is given by
nature. This lime of argument also interacts with our next group of obstacles in that a lack of
competitive advantage shows up as a balance of trade constraint on growth.
Second, many.of  the;factors.,svhichwouldbelabeled as+imperfections’:according.to,the~ben@na&;
of perfect competition (ii. the.,sense  that they .would  -be absent from perfect compet$ion).do.,have,.a..
posiive  role to play in the operation of a market economy. A particular example of this would be the
use of long term contracts in the labor market, which would be absent from a so-called flexible labor
market which mimics the spot market of perfect competition. Long term contracts can help to
promote training, the involvement of workers in the working of the enterprise and the reduction of
an adversarial relationship between employees and employers, all of which could be reasonably
expected to have a positive impact on productivity. Similar arguments can be applied to trade unions,
minimum wages etc..
Third, there are a variety of constraints on the achievement of full employment, though not all of them
are biding ones at any specific time. The recognition of these constraints is a statement that market
forces are not sufficient by themselves to generate full employment. In the next section, we discuss
those~constraints  in some detail.
IV. CONSTRAINTS ON FULL EMPLOYMENT
There are six potential constraints on the achievement of full employment on which we focus here:
the list is probably not exhaustive but contains those we feel to be particularly important. The
constraints are not binding all of the time, and in particular the foreign trade constraint does not
(indeed cannot) apply to all countries.* The constraints are:
Aggregate Demand Constraint
There is, in our view, a notable lack of automatic forces within a market economy working to ensure
that the level of aggregate demand is compatible with the full employment of labor and the existing
capital stock. There may be times (and perhaps the 1950s was such a period for most capitalist
market economies) when investment demand is high relative to savings, and there is sufficient
aggregate demand. But in the absence of ‘enthusiastic animal spirits’ and when savings tend to exceed
investment expenditure, the forces bring savings and investment into line at full employment are weak
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through a lower price level and interest rates bringing (ex ante) savings and investment into balance.
The effect of lower prices on real wealth is minimal in industrialized economies where the money
supply consists overwhelmingly of credit money so that the real value of financial assets and liabilities
vary together.9 The generation of lower prices must involve at some point falling prices, but whilst
the former can be analyzed within the conventional static framework, the latter cannot. Yet, falling
prices generate expectations of fbrther falls (thereby reducing demand) and undermine the ability of
debtors to service their liabiities and thus threatening the stability of the financial system (Davidson,
1994, pp. 193-i’%).
Interest rates are determined more by liquidity considerations than by the forces of productivity and
thrift. Specifically in&-e& rates do not act to bring savings and investment into line. Planned savings
are determined by a quite different set of variables than those determining planned investment, and
there are no strong forces which ensure their equality at full employment income.”
Fun&g Budget Deficits
When fbll employment income would generate an excess of savings over investment, what are the
limits on the use of budget deficits to fill the gap. There are two possible (though to some degree
related) limits on the abiity of governments to run a budget deficit sufficient to underpin  111
employment. The first arises from the argument that continuing budget deficits are unsustainable, and
the second f?om the reaction of the financial markets. A budget deficit may be seen as unsustainable
in a variety of ways but it is suggested here that three are particularly significant  : namely a budget
deficit would be seen as unsustainable ifit lead to a spiraling national debt to GDP ratio (and hence
to rising interest payments on the debt relative to GDP), or that the level of interest payments whilst
not rising (relative to GDP) may nevertheless be perceived as placing a heavy burden on taxpayers,
or there are limits on the willingness of wealth holders to absorb government bonds into their asset
portfolio without the payment of higher interest rates. However, whilst interest payments may in some
sense be high, they are in effect paid by further borrowing (since in this analysis, although the primary
budget’ deficit is being held constant, the deficit including interest payments is rising but is beiig
financed by borrowing).The  debt to GDP ratio will not rise provided that g 2 r , with g the growth
rate of the economy and r the (post tax) rate of interest (Sawyer, 1995a; Pasinetti, 1996). The
difEculty  for budget deficits which has arisen in recent years is simply that real rates of interest have
been at historically unprecedently  high levels whilst economic growth has been sluggish.” The higher
interest rates can be attributed to the pursuit of tight monetary policies in the belief that tight money
and high interest rates will (eventually) dampen down inflation. In so far as government, like
individuals, face the ‘principle of increasing risk’ (Kale&i,  1937) then higher deficits (relative to
. GDP) would entail higher interest rates and hence the maximum sustainable budget deficit would be
determined by g = r(d) where d is the debt to GDP ratio . Since if (s - r) is positive and likely to be
rather small, i.e. of the order of 0.01 or 0.02, the debt to GDP ratio will stabilize at a large multiple
of the primary budget deficit to GDP ratio (clearly with numbers given previously at multiples of 100
or SO). Further, any lack of willingness of the private sector to absorb government debt as an
increasing proportion of their wealth portfolio is another limit on governments to run perpetual
deficits.
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deficits) and they do so through two channels. First, interest rates (particularly on bonds) rise with
a budget deficit thereby limiting the government’s ability to borrow. It could be argued that high
interest rates arose from high levels of government borrowing. But the evidence linking budget
deficits and interest rates is weak. For example, Cunningham and Vilasuso (1994/95) have to concede
that ‘[u]nfortunately,  empirical studies examining the relationship between interest rates and fiscal
deficits are far from conclusive’(p. 190) and that ‘whether fiscal deficits are associated with higher
interest rates has yet to be resolved in the economics literature’ (p. 191). Second, adverse reactions
by the foreign exchange markets to particular policies can lead to fall in the value of the currency. The
distinction made by Sayer (1992) in his discussion of the power of the City of London as to ‘whether
market prices are based on economic fundamentals or bubbles, fads and herd behaviour’ is useful.
Even if the actions of the financial markets are based on bubbles, fads etc. they may nevertheless
influence the economic fundamentals. Clearly, if the fad raises interest rates, investment may be
thereby effected and;hence  the.fi.mdamentalsof  the economy changed. Similarly,~a  falling exchange : . -
rate would stimulate domestic.inflation  which.would  change the fundamental value of the (nominal)  .I.
exchange rate. Even when financial asset prices reflect fundamentals, the operation of financial
markets may still pose a constraint on the economic policies pursued. The ‘fundamentals’ of interest
to the financial markets may be quite different from the ‘fundamentals’ of concern to others: for
example, the financial markets may focus more on the rate of inflation whilst others may feel that
unemployment is of more importance.
The financial markets pose a different type of constraint on the pursuit of sustainable fiscal policies
when the ‘bubbles, fads and herd behaviour’, rather than ‘fundamentals’ come to determine
movements in prices (notably interest rates and exchange rates). There is now an extensive literature
which indicates that financial market prices are ‘excessively volatile’ (and casual observation of the
movements in the exchange rates in the past twenty years would be supportive of that view; see, also,
Shill&, 1981, 1984, 1990, and his 1989 collection, where it is strongly suggested that there is
excessive volatility in the stock and bond markets). Further, there are theoretical literatures (surveyed
by, for example, Camerer, 1989) which provide models in which individual rational behaviour can
generate ‘bubbles’. In a world of uncertainty where knowledge of the economic fundamentals is given
to few, it is perhaps inevitable that asset prices will fluctuate and follow fads and fashions. The
significant question here is whether the adoption of a Keynesian demand reflation would set off
adverse reactions in the financial markets, and whether those reactions undermine the reflation. The
reactions are Iikely to create an air of crisis and strong political pressures to abort the reflation.
We view the financial markets as a source of instability which can be transmitted to other sectors of
the economy and the participants in those markets as able to impose their objectives on economic
policy-making. The pursuit of Keynesian policies (and more generally the achievement of full
employment) require restrain the power and influence of the financial markets and elsewhere we have
made some ‘modest proposals’ in this regard in respect of European monetary institutions and the
imposition of a tax on financial transactions (Arestis and Sawyer, 1996, 1997b, 1997c).
Inflation Constraint
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till employment in three stages. First, we can consider whether the NAJRU (non-accelerating
inflation rate of unemployment) as it is conventionally conceived forms an inflation barrier to  till
employment. Many of the estimates of the NAIRU (see, for example, Layard, Nickel1 and Jackman,
1991, chap 8) would suggest inflation can only be held in check when unemployment is well in excess
of anything which would be regarded as full employment.12 Further, the NAIRU is viewed as an
essentially supply-side phenomenon, with aggregate demand having to adjust to the NAIRU.i3
In this regard, we-can first note that the concept of the NAIRU (rather than any NAIRU itself) may
form a barrier to fill employment when policy makers and others believe (or act as though they
believe) that it exists.’ For example, ‘I have become convinced that the NAIRU is a useful analytic
concept. It is useful as a theory to understand the causes of inflation. It is useful as an empirical basis
for predicting changes in the inflation rate. And it is useful  as a general guideline for thinking about
macroeconomic policy’ (Stiglitz, 1997, p.3).. In such a case, a fall in unemployment- below the
estimated NAIRU produces a policy response to reduce demand and raise  .unemployment  .because
of the fear of rising inflation. We would, though, cast doubt on the concept of the NAIRU on two
counts (for a much extended discussion see Sawyer, 1997a, -I 997b, 1997c). First, there is a degree
of theoretical incoherence to the models. The manner in which the equilibrium would be reached is
not spelt out. The underlying relationships (usually price and wage determination) could be shifted
through, for example, increases in capacity, thereby shifting the NAIRU. Multiple equilibria are not
ruled out (see, for example, Manning, 1992). These problems have been summarized by Hahn (1995)
in the following. ‘Under imperfect competition there is no compelling reason to suppose that the
‘demand’ for labor is negatively sloped nor is there any reason to suppose that it has only one
intersection with the ‘supply’ curve. Increasing returns are quite sufficient to give us what we want
here. . ..Of course if there are multiple equilibria then even if we can be sure of convergent dynamic
processes, initial conditions (history’) will play an important role in which equilibrium is eventually
established.’ (p.47). We would concur with Frank Hahn when he writes that ‘Theories of the natural
rate are amongst the class of shaky and vastly incomplete theories.’ (Hahn, 1995, p-54). Further,
recent contributions (Rowthorn,  1995; Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho  Mariscal, 1997, Sawyer,
1997d) emphasise both the theoretical and empirical relationship between unemployment and
investment in fixed capital and in education and training.
Second, the estimates of the NAIRU (even when produced after much econometric effort) change
over time, tend to move in line with actual experience of unemployment and are sensitive to the model
specification and methods of estimation. Nickel1 (1990) and Layard, Nickel! and  Jackman  (199 1)
provide estimates of the actual and the equilibrium rate of unemployment (equivalent to the NAIRU)
in the UK and in 19 other countries respectively for each of the last three decades to conclude that
the two types of unemployment move together. Lombard (1995) reports three estimates for the
NAIRU in France for the early 1980s to suggest a high level of NAIRU and some sensitivity to
methods of estimation. Further estimates covering a wide range of countries are given in OECD
(1994, p.22) and ECE (1992, Table 5.7). Setterfield,-Gordon and Osberg (1992) suggest that
“estimates ofthe NAIRU [for Canada] are extremely sensitive to model specification, the definition
of variables and the sample period used. [Further] . . . the final range of all NAIRU estimates . . . is
about 5.5 percentage points. Indeed, the size of this range is so great that it covers virtually the entire
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Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission concluded that the concept of the
NAIRU is ‘unusable operationally’ because “empirical studies on both sides of the Atlantic have
shown that large variations in NAiRU may be caused by apparently small differences in sample,
retained explanatory variables and analytical formulation. Furthermore, the confidence interval around
these estimates is so large that it generally contains the whole historical range of unemployment rates
observed in the last 15 to 20 years” (European Economy, January, 1995, p. 2). But as UNCTAD
(1995) observes “natural rate estimates are still used to assess and guide macroeconomic policy,
thereby contributing to rising unemployment” (p. 172).
The second stage of our discussion relates to the case where the NAIRU may be shiftable through
a variety of policy measures and/or there is evidence of genuine hysteresis effects.” The policy
measures would include, for example, the stimulation of investment, which thereby increases capacity
and permits a higher level of employment(Sawyer;.  1997c). However, starting fi-oma high.level.of
unemployment, any stimulation of demand maywell lead to some increase in ,inflation, whichbecomes -
embedded into the system. Suppose, for example, &at the ‘equilibrium’ unemployment rate is initially
10 per cent, but that through demand stimulation policies (which increase capacity, re-integrate
people back into the work force etc.) it could be reduced to 5 per cent. The initial f%Jl in
unemployment to 9 per cent, to 8 per cent etc., would be associated with some rise in inflation, which
is then built into people’s expectations. After some time both actual and equilibrium unemployment
settle at 5 per cent: infiation would no longer accelerate, but it would have reached a higher level. In
such a case there would be many pressures to halt the fall in unemployment to restrain inflation, and
a higher level of inflation would have to be accepted for the lower unemployment.
Third, there could be inflationary pressures associated with fbll employment itself In these
ciraunstances  inflation is likely to be the expression of some other underlying constraints, and should
perhaps be more appropriately assigned elsewhere. However, it may be useful to list them here and
we ident@ three. First, inadequate capacity to be able to employ the full workforce at an acceptable
real wage. This shortage of capacity may be in terms of the overall level of capital equipment, but
other important dimensions would be regional distribution of the capital stock and the skill capacity
of the workforce. Second, productivity and work effort at full employment may begin to  Ml. In
Kale&i’s words ‘profits would be higher under a regime of Ml employment than they are on the
average under laissez-faire ; and even the rise in wage rates resulting from the stronger bargaining
power of the workers is less likely to reduce profits than to increase prices, and thus adversely afl%cts
only the rentier interests. But ‘discipline in the factories’ and ‘political stability’ are more appreciated
than profits by business leaders.’ (Kale&i, 1943). This is further considered below under the high
productivity constraint, but it would also exhibit itself in terms of inflation. For example, if
productivity were to fall, then for given money wages, prices would begin to rise. Further, the lack
of ‘factory discipline’ would also be reflected in pressure for rising’money wages, which also relates
to our next point. Third, the various claims which are made on national income at full employment
may be incompatible. In one sense, it should be easier io reconcile conflicting claims on national
income at fi.rll employment simply because there is more income to share out. But, the constraints on
the pursuit of the competing claims are also reduced. There is the added problem that as full-
employment is reached, the distribution of income may become so skewed in favour of profits that
8 August 19, 1997the conflict between wages and profits intensifies.
Our approach to inflation is to see it as arising from imbalances on the real side of the economy,
although inflation has to be validated by corresponding increases in the money supply. However, the
financial and banking systems are such that money is created to meet the nominal ‘needs of trade’
(Are&s, 1987-8, Arestis and Howells,  1996 and references therein). Effective control over the stock
of money has long slipped from the grasp of the Central Bank and other State institutions, and any
inflationary pressures would be little constrained by the stock of money which can evolve in response
to price and wage changes. Thus, even if limiting the growth of the stock money would constrain
inflation (rather than reducing output), such a monetary policy is no longer available to governments
in a deregulated internationalized monetary system.
Balance of Trade Constraint
The balance of trade constraint has a level-and agrowth dimension. A difference between importsat&
exports has to be covered by borrowing from overseas, and hence creates obligations for future
interest payments. A persistent trade deficit would involve a growing current account deficit as  the
interest payments on borrowing builds up. However, provided that the growth of the domestic
economy exceeds the rate of interest on foreign borrowing, the ratio of liabilities to domestic income,
and hence the interest payments to income, would eventually stabilize (Sawyer, 1995a).” However,
the condition of the domestic growth rate exceeding the rate of interest may not be met, leading to
the debt trap situation. The growth aspect of the balance of trade constraint arises if there is a
tendency for the growth of imports to exceed the growth of exports. Simply when the (domestic)
income elasticity of demand for imports is greater than the (world) income elasticity of demand for
the count@s  exports, then the maintenance of a non-exploding trade deficit requires that the domestic
growth rate is sufficiently below the world growth rate so that actual imports and exports grow in
line with one another (Thirlwall, 1979; McCombie  and Thirlwall, 1997a, 1997b, and Symposium in
Jourraal of Post Keynesian Economics,  1997). Clearly the balance of trade constraint is not one which
impacts on all countries, simply because whilst some countries run trade deficits, others must run
trade surpluses. Further, the constraint can be eased by devaluation of the currency, though such a
route is often resisted because of its perceived effect on inflation and the reduction of domestic living
standards (not to mention national pride). The effects of devaluation are more complex, of course:
devaluation can stimulate exports and hence production, often leading to lower unit costs; importers
need not respond to devaluation by raising price (in terms of the domestic currency) as they strive to
maintain market share (Arestis and Milberg, 1993; Cowling and Sugden, 1989).
High Productivity Constraint
The attainment of high levels of productivity requires an appropriate work intensity and commitment
on the part of the labor force as well as the provision of sufficient capital equipment, training, skills
and management. In many market economies, unemployment (and more particularly the threat of it)
serves as a significant mechanism for imposing a high level of work intensity (Kale&i,  1943). The
idea that unemployment may be required to impose a ‘no shirking’ condition on workers is formalized
in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Bowies (I 985). The level of unemployment is not chosen by the
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as performing a systemic function (of aiding the disciplining of workers). This is not to argue that
unemployment is necessmy to ensure work effort; indeed unemployment heightens fear and brings
demoralization which serve to undermine it, and different market economies have drawn on
mechanisms other than unemployment. Weisskopf (1987), for example, examines the extent to which
countries use unemployment as a disciplinary device, and concludes that only some economies use
it. This raises the ‘important question of an institutional framework which maintains labor discipline
and does not blunt incentives, even when the economy sustains full employment..... The problem is
not insoluble in principle or in practice, as indicated by the experience of large Japanese firms offering
lifetime employment to their workers and a renumeration package based largely on seniority’ (Six&,
1994, p.489). A sustained high level of employment would of course require the development of other
mechanisms to underpin high levels of productivity. These mechanisms are likely to include forms of
worker involvement~and~participationrin~decision-malcing,~job  enrichment etc;.~ .
Lack of Capacity
The f$ctors which influence investment and thereby the size of the capital stock (such as profitabiity,
capacity utiliition) are generally rather different  Tom the factors which determine the size of the
work force (mainly demographic). From that crude observation, we could say that there is no
particular reason to think that the capital’stock will be adequate for the provision of full employment.
There are rather limited opportunities, especially in the short run, for substitution between labor and
capital stock. We would expect that after a period of prolonged slow growth (such as the past two
decades) investment may have fallen short of what would be required to sustain full employment.
v. KEYNESIAN POLICIES
We begin by a consideration of demand oriented policies. In doing so, we recognize that the current
level of demand has numerous effects on the future supply potential of the economy, through, for
example, the effects of current investment on future capital stock and productive capacity, the effects
of current employment levels on the t%ture potential labor force.16 A major aspect of Keynesian policy
remains fiscal policy, but that which is of interest here is not the use of fiscal policy for fine tuning
(for there is inadequate up to date i&m-nation  and forecasting ability to enable fiscal policy to be used
successfilly in that regard), but rather fiscal policy should be set for the medium term to.underpin
high levels of aggregate demand. Asan aside, it can be noted that ironically in recent yearsfine  tuning
has been associated with monetary policy with frequent changes in interest rates. We are fully aware
that there are many theoretical arguments to the effect that fiscal policy will be impotent, but we
would argue that those theoretical arguments begin from a position of full employment equilibrium
(the clearest example beiig the ‘natural rate of unemployment’) and hence are in effect assuming what
is to be proved. Not surprisingly, models which do not impose such constraints find fiscal policy can
be potent. We would then focus on two issues. Fii what evidence is there that fiscal policy can have
an effect? Arestis and Bain (1994) review the literature and provide evidence (at least for the UK
case) which suggests that there is no crowding out of private expenditure by public expenditure.
Moreover, as discussed above, the evidence linking budget deficits and interest rates is weak.
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of budget deficits warranted? A major limit to budget deficits does not arise from the size of the
deficit per se but rather Corn the relationship between the (post tax) rate of interest, r, and the rate
of growth of national income, g. It is well known that the debt to national income ratio will explode
for any initial deficit if ra. Whereas for much of the postwar period this condition did not apply,
more recent experience with higher real (and nominal) interest rates and lower growth rates has been
in the other direction.  Even ifr is slightly below g, nevertheless the debt to income ratio which results
may be in some significant (political) sense large, for the sustainable debt ratio is equal to the primary
deficit to income ratio times the reciprocal of (,g- r). This raises the issue of why interest rates have
been so high in the past fifteen years, and we would largely ascribe that experience to widespread
attempts to operate tight monetary policies.
The national income;accounting  counterpart of a budget deficit is some combination of net private _
savings (savings minusinvestment) and trade deficit (capita1 inflow). In effect, the alternative to
running a budget deficit to secure aggregate demand compatible with the desired level of
employment, is some combination of a reduction in private net savings and in the trade deficit. Whilst
the achievement of such reductions is not a straightforward matter (but may be desired on other
grounds), such macro economic planning would be an alternative to budget deficits. The
encouragement of investment is clearly one possibility in this regard, though ultimately the ratio of
net investment in national income is limited by the rate of.growth  of national income itself(which  may
be enhanced by investment) and of the (incremental) capital output ratio (for otherwise the capital
to actual output ratio would decline with some combination of falling capacity utilization and rate of
profit).
Monetary policy can also have a significant impact on the level of economic activity, and we would
not dismiss its role. We would though wish to argue that the stock of money is no longer  (iit ever
was) readily controllable by the authorities, and that monetary policy now is effectively interest rate
policy (Goodhart, 1989). Any policy on interest rates is inevitably circumscribed by global financial
markets, and interest rate changes are politically sensitive. Interest rate variations may be more potent
than hitherto with the spread of consumer credit and variable interest rate borrowing (Arestis and
Howells, 1996). A monetary policy is required which pitches interest rates as low as possible (bearing
in mind international constraints) for this may give some (possibly slight) stimulus to demand but also
relieves the constraint indicated above on the use of fiscal policy.
High levels of employment would be enhanced by an acceptable international monetary system. The
first is that it should ensure a degree of stability in exchange rates which encourages trade. This would
rule out a flexible exchange rate system with the considerable volatility of exchange rates observed
during the late 1970s and the 1980s. On the other hand, a rigid fixed exchange rate system generates
pressures which ultimately blow it apart (as illustrated by the experience of the ERM in the early
1990s). This suggests an adjustable peg system with arrangements for deficit countries to overcome
their deficit position without deflationary biases (Davidson, 1992, on the international monetary
system; Arestis, 1994, on the European monetary system). The major requirement for any
international monetary system in the context of the pursuit of full employment is the avoidance of
deflationary biases, and the ability of countries to adjust to trade deficits without reducing demand.
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Cnancial  flows which tend to increase the volatility of exchange rates. The role of domestic financial
institutions should be viewed as serving the needs of production for it is from production that income
and wealth are generated. Specifically, institutional arrangements and regulations are required which.
channel  savings into productive investment and which ensures that the fragility  of the financial system
does not spill over into instabiity with adverse effects on the productive economy. This may require,
for example, the imposition of lending ratios to prevent the overexpansion of credit as happened in
the UK in the late 198Os, especially where the rapid growth of credit spills over mainly into asset
price inflation (rather than any stimulation of production). The essential problem which lies at the
heart of financial arrangements, whether domestic or international, is that the creation of money can
help finance an expansion of real output or an increase in prices. Similarly, the provision of finance
fbr countries experiencing trade deficits can be used to make changes in the economy which will lead
to improved internationalzompetitiveness  orit can be used for (unsustainable-levels of) cowption.  ,
In terms of lifting supply-side:constraints  through whatwe have termed supply-enhancing policies,. .
we first consider the problem of inflation. There are a number of routes through which inflationary
pressures can be restrained, some of which are more socially acceptable than others. One route is low
levels of demand which limit the ability of firms to raise prices and work& to increase wages, but
that would, of course, con&t with the.aim of fill employment. Another route is the generation of
a consensus over the distribution of income.” The worsening of inequality which has been particularly
apparent in the UK and USA since the late 1970s (cf. Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding, 1995) has
made the prospects for the creation of a consensus on the distribution of income (which would
include the division between wages and profits, and relative eamings) more diicult. A consensus is
obviously not something that can be switched on and off. Thus policy proposals in this direction have
to focus more on in&utional arrangements which minimize the inflationary consequences of pay and
pricedetermination. There is no particular reason to think that decentralized wage determination with
an emphasis on performance-related pay would be non-inflationary at or near  111 employment. If
atomistic bargaining involves frequent price and wage adjustments, then it is likely to speed up the
inflationary process, whereas a degree of institutional rigidity places some brake on upward price and
wage adjustments. Further, the more negotiating units there are, the less each one pays attention to
the overall impact of their own settlement, and the less effect will any call for wage restraint have.
The literature on the impact of institutional arrangements (including wage bargaining structures) on
economic performance has focused on the effects on unemployment (e.g. Calmfors and Drifiill, 1988;
Calmfors,  1993). Our concerns, however,“.are  different in that we are mindfL1 whether the wage and
price setting arrangements are consistent with the absence of inflationary pressures at full
employment. We suggest that some degree of centralization and of coordination of pay setting will
be required.
A second aspect of supply enhancing policies arises fi-om the requirement for something approaching
a balance on the overseas current account at an acceptable level of unemployment which means an
abiity to compete in (relatively) high technology sectors. The current account requirement means that
roughly speaking the growth of imports and of exports must be aligned. The growth of the domestic
economy is then set by the growth of the world economy, and the relative (marginal) propensities to
import with the rest of the world. A relatively high propensity to import by the domestic country
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rate in the country relative to the rest of the world. Further if that growth rate is below the growth
of productivity in the domestic country then rising unemployment would be the consequence. What
the domestic country needs under these circumstances is the development of new products and
processes which require not only investment in research and development but also the formation of
linkages between companies to develop the whole production system. In other words, an industrial
strategy is required. The essence of an industrial strategy is a commitment by government to the
support of industrial development. It springs from the view that government can play a key strategic
role in fostering such development. An industrial strategy does not involve detailed central planning
but rather the development of an overall coherent strategy, so that detailed decisions on, for example,
support of research and development can be made on an informed basis. It is well known that
economic activities such as provision of training and skills, the undertaking of research and
development are likely .to. be under-provided by an un&ttered  market. Whilst?the>case:for  an industrial: v.
strategy would draw on such arguments, it involves more than correcting ‘market Mums’. It
provides a f%amework for decision-making by government and by private enterprise, and commits the
government to a developmental role in economic policy.
* The final aspect of supply-enhancing policies to be considered is that of the organization of work. The
point has been made above that unemployment serves as a control mechanism on workers to enforce
work intensity, and that till employment would require the development of alternative ‘control
mechanisms’; There is substantial evidence that worker participation in decision-making enhances
productivi~  ( see, e.g., Levine and Tyson, 1990; Sawyer, 1989, pp. 66-73). Further, many enterprises
have used various forms of worker involvement in the search for higher levels of productivity. But
this is not universally the case. for other enterprises do not have any such involvement and make
undisguised use of the threat of job loss. Whatever mechanism an enterprise uses (and a combination
may be used and/or different. ones may be used for different types of workers), it does so against a
background of unemployment. It remains an open question whether there has to be some external
pressures on workers to ensure work intensity. This external pressure may be exercised through the
threat which competition from other firms poses for the survival of the workers’ own firm.
Competition will always involve winners and losers, and major losers will be the workers in the firm
which does not survive. Temporary unemployment for the individual will remain a feature of any
dynamic economy in which there is competition between independent firms. The challenge raised here
is to find ways of organizing work such that the economic system does not require unemployment
as a ‘back-up’ threat. The participation of workers in decision-making and a drive to eliminate ‘dirty’
and uninteresting jobs through technological change may help in this regard. At relatively high levels
of productivity, degrees of technical inefficiency may be a price worth paying for full employment.
But the view expressed here is that the development of a range of ways which encourage technical
efficiency is necessary if unemployment is to be removed.
A number of authors (Gordon, 1996, Singh, 1996, Pfeffer, 1994”) have talked in terms of two
different roads which an economy can follow (though no doubt there are many in-between roads)
which they label the ‘high road’ and the ‘low road’. The use of such terms is (perhaps deliberately
?) pejorative for high is generally preferred to low. The significance for this paper of this dichotomy
is that the two ‘roads’ come from alternative views of how a market economy could work. The ‘low
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intensity of work and productive efficiency are enforced through unemployment and competition for
work. However, there is a sharp distinction between the (perhaps) prevailing (right of centre)
orthodoxy on how competitive markets work and the view which is implicit in the writings of the
above mentioned authors. For the orthodox, competition (especially in its perfectly competitive guise)
promotes fbll employment, a degree of equality (at least the elimination of ‘unwarranted’ inequalities)
and provides incentives for growth. Whilst the above mentioned authors would not share every detail
of the analysis of markets which we have put forward above, they would, we believe, share its general .._
thrust in seeing unfettered markets as leading to unemployment and inequalities.19  In contrast, the
‘high road’ seeks to build an economy in which there are high levels of investment and technological
change (as the basis for high levels of productivity) in which there is substantial worker involvement.
‘The successful implementation of the high road approach requires important institutional changes
which emphasize cooperative relationship between workers .employers  and governments in individual .‘.
countries as well as between nationstates.in~both:theNorthand  the South’.(Singh,~l996)  .I
VI. SOME REMAINING ISSUES
There are two major issues which a Keynesian analysis must f&x, and which we only have space here
to note. Fii there is the question of globalization (including transnational foreign direct investment,
the cross-border integration of production and the international operations of financial markets). We
would argue that these factors, especially unregulated capital flows and the dominance of financial
markets resulting from the lack of economic co-ordination between the leading industrial countries,
tend to induce a deficiency of aggregate demand. This leads to a situation where the balance of
payments disequilibria between countries can only be resolved at a lower rate of growth of world
aggregate demand than that which is compatible with full employment in all countries. What is,
therefore, needed to achieve the required rates of growth of real demand are deep institutional
changes at both the national and international levels (see, also, Singh, 1997).
Keynesian policies have become associated with national policies pursued by independent
governments with little attempt at coordination as in the Bretton Woods era with some potential for
using exchange controls. That era has been vividly described by Singh (1997) in the following
manner: it was based on “cooperative relationships between employees, employers and the
government at a national level and between nation states at the international level. . . . At the
international level . . . the world trade and financial system worked in a stable and predictable way
under the hegemony of the U.S., the dominant economic power for most of this period”. By contrast,
the current economic order “emphasises the supremacy of market forces; it eschews government
regulation of labour, product or capital markets, as well as non-market co-operative relationships
between governments, employees, and employers such as ‘income policies’. Similarly, at the
international level, instead of co-operation between nation states, economic relationships are
increasingly dominated by market forces unleashed by liberalisation and globalisation” (p.6).
We have not specified the level of government-at which Keynesian policies should be applied (though
the balance of payments constraint operates at the national level). We would accept that national
governments are more constrained than during the Bretton  Woods era in their pursuit of monetary
14 August 19, 1997and fiscal policies, not least because of the greater openness of economies and the consequent greater
leakages abroad of demand and the much increased scale of financial markets. In some areas of
supply-enhancing measures, the appropriate level of government may be below the national level
(though that would depend to some degree on the size of the nation). Demand management policies
within a European economy would face less by the way of demand leakages than the individual
countries would but obviously the absence of a European federal authority rules such policies out for
the present (though European monetary policy will come into effect when the European Central Bank
is in place). And yet policies of international cooperation are paramount. Such policies should
embrace trade as well as fiscal and monetary policy, and should also aim at the level of production
(for example building an international system of small firm production networks as an antidote to the
giant international firm).
Second, the implementation-of ~policiesrequires  :a;competent  and committed: Stateas~:weU..asa
supportive electorate (or perhaps~moreaccurately~supportive  :powers  that be’): Of equalimportance, :
if not more though, is the wider institutional tiework in place, which gives rise to the new concept
of ‘good’ governance. The same kind of policies may work very differently in diierent countries
because ofdifzerences in the ef%ctiveness  of the institutions which implement them. An effective and
uncorrupt civil service is in a better position to design and implement policies which address market
failure than an ineffective and corrupt one which is seen as acting as a tax on the productive activities
of the economy (World Bank, 1993b). For example, bribing officials to obtain permits and licenses
by investors, giving passages through customs, prohibiting the entry of competitors etc., become the
focus of activity in corrupt economies. Corruption is both ‘pervasive and significant’ in both
developing and developed countries and is costly to economic development for two reasons: the
weakness of the central government which allows corrupt bureaucrats to stop productive projects
from materializing, thus hampering investment; and the necessary secrecy of corruption which can
entail shifts in investment away from high-valued projects to ‘useless’ projects if these provide better
opportunities for secret corruption.
VU. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The argument of the paper may be briefly summarized. Government intervention is necessary in
principle to achieve and maintain f2.l employment. The increased power of trade unions and workers
at full employment along with the resulting inflationary pressures must be addressed. Social consensus
on the distribution of income along with wage and prices setting mechanisms which are ‘friendly’ to
low inflation should be considered seriously. There could very well arise a serious balance-of-
payments constraint well before full employment is reached. Policies to enhance the supply side of
the economy may be necessary to alleviate this problem. Even with sufficient demand, full
employment might still be difficult, ifnot impossible, to maintain, if there is inadequate or unbalanced
supply potential. The paper has attempted to demonstrate the potential of these economic policies
and in doing so it has touched upon the constraints and obstacles that may be present in their
implementation.
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2. It is our general view that the perceived commitment by many governments to the use of
reflationaty measures to maintain high levels of employment was an important ingredient, amongst
many others, of the causes of the post war boom up to 1973. During that period, the high levels of
investment reduced the requirements for budget deficits to underpin high levels of demand, and it is
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uncertainty which would foster investment (see, also, Federer, 1993).
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